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1. Introduction
Ever since the publication of Olson’s “The Logic of Collective Action” (Olson,
1965), group size has been considered important in determining how successful a
group will be in attaining its common goals. Specifically, Olson suggested that “[t]he
larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of providing the optimal supply of any
collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount
of such a good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common
interests” (Olson, 1965, p. 36). These suggestions have attracted much attention
in economics and political science but providing firm theoretical underpinnings has
proven challenging (Sandler, 2015). While such group size effects are well understood
for some of the standard models of collective action (e.g., Chamberlin, 1974; McGuire,
1974; Andreoni, 1988), for other such models this is not the case.
In this paper we investigate group size effects for the class of participation games
without refunds introduced in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) to model the private
provision of a discrete public good. In such a threshold game, n group members
decide simultaneously whether to contribute to a public good or not (to participate
or not). All contributors pay a non-refundable cost. The public good is provided if
and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold k, in which
case all group members receive the same benefit from the provision of the public
good. The threshold, the group size, and the identical cost of contributing to the
public good are known to all players. We assume that the threshold is larger than
one, thereby focusing on what Myatt and Wallace (2008b) call a “teamwork dilemma”
rather than on the volunteer’s dilemma popularized by Diekmann (1985).
This threshold game is a stark model, which deliberately abstracts from asymme-
tries and incomplete information about costs and benefits by assuming that all group
members are identical (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984, p. 172). For our purposes this
is an attractive features as it isolates the effects of changes in group size from the
effects of changes in the composition of the group, thereby allowing us to focus on
the former.1 We further abstract from the possibility of role identification and thus
restrict attention to symmetric (Nash) equilibria in which all group members employ
the same (mixed) strategy and therefore obtain the same equilibrium payoff.2 Of
1See Sandler (2015) for a summary of Olson’s hypotheses on the effects of group composition
and some of the literature investigating such effects.
2The impossibility of role identification is the standard justification for the focus on the symmetric
strategy profiles in symmetric games in evolutionary game theory (see Weibull, 1995). The robustness
of such symmetric equilibria against perturbations (which maintain the structure of a threshold
public good game but abandon symmetry) is discussed in Kalandrakis (2009), who obtains a
purification result along the lines of Harsanyi (1973). See Binmore and Samuelson (2001) for
a discussion of the relationship between the purification of mixed strategy equilibria and their
evolutionary stability in an environment with noisy role identification. For a more heuristic
justification for the focus on the symmetric equilibria in participation games see Dixit and Olson
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course, the assumption that there is no role identification makes what is already
a stark model even starker. In particular, this assumption is not satisfied if group
members interact repeatedly and therefore can condition their behavior on actions
played in the past. Our approach to the investigation of group size effects is thus
orthogonal to the one pursued in Myatt and Wallace (2002), Myatt and Wallace
(2008a) and Myatt and Wallace (2008b) who use stochastic stability arguments akin
to the ones developed in Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) to select among
the pure strategy equilibria in repeated threshold games played by myopic players
and study the composition affects arising in asymmetric games together with group
size effects. Due to their focus on pure strategy equilibria, the papers by Myatt and
Wallace find that the selected equilibrium features a probability of provision that
is either zero or one. In contrast, we model a situation in which the probability of
provision can change more gradually with group size. Over a large range of parameter
values this is indeed what we find.
Generically (more precisely, for all but a countable set of cost parameters) our
model has one or three symmetric equilibria. As it is always a symmetric equilibrium
for no one to contribute, uniqueness obtains if and only if cost is so high and the
group so large as to imply that the public good cannot be provided in a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence, we face a multiplicity problem whenever the model allows for a
non-trivial symmetric equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium in which the public good
is provided with strictly positive probability. We resolve this problem by focusing
on the — uniquely determined — best symmetric equilibria, that is, the one which
provides all agents with the highest expected payoff among the symmetric equilibria.
This is also the symmetric equilibrium with the highest participation probability and
the highest success probability (i.e., the highest probability that the public good is
provided) among the symmetric equilibria and we thus refer to it as the maximal
equilibrium.
We can think of two distinct reasons justifying our focus on the maximal equi-
librium. First, it is of intrinsic economic interest to ask how the best equilibrium
outcome that a group can achieve (under the coordination friction implied by the
symmetry constraint that we presume to be unavoidable) depends on group size.
Second, among the two non-trivial symmetric equilibria the one we consider is stable
under the standard dynamics (e.g., the replicator dynamics) considered in evolution-
ary game theory, whereas the other one is unstable.3 Consequently, whenever there
(2000).
3This is immediate from the fact that, as we note in Section 2.2 and illustrate in Figure 1, the
pivot probability, defined in equation (1), is strictly decreasing (increasing) in the participation
probability at the larger (smaller) of the two non-trivial symmetric equilibria. See McBride (2006)
for informal discussion and Pen˜a et al. (2014), who provide an evolutionary model and characterize
the stability properties of symmetric equilibria for a broad class of symmetric binary-action games,
for a proof.
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are multiple symmetric equilibria only the maximal and the trivial equilibrium (which
is always stable) are of relevance. In an evolutionary analysis of threshold games it
is then natural to focus on the comparative statics of the maximal equilibrium (cf.
Bach et al., 2006; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). Nevertheless, it is of interest to
understand how our comparative statics results depend on our focus on the maximal
equilibrium. We therefore discuss how some of our key results would change if one
were to consider the smaller of the two non-trivial symmetric equilibria instead.
Section 2 notes some fundamental facts about the symmetric equilibria of the
threshold game we consider. All of these are immediate from Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1984). We then begin our study of maximal equilibria by observing that (over
the range of group sizes for which a non-trivial symmetric equilibrium exists) the
participation probability in such an equilibrium is strictly decreasing in group size.
We state this well-known result (e.g., Offerman, 1997; Hindriks and Pancs, 2002) as
Proposition 1 in Section 3.1.
Our main results (Proposition 2 in Section 3.2 and Proposition 3 in Section
3.3) show that the expected payoff and success probability that are induced by the
maximal equilibrium are strictly decreasing in group size until group size reaches
a critical value (which may be infinite) beyond which the public good cannot be
provided. We view Proposition 2 as confirmation of Olson’s maxim that “the larger
the group, the less it will further its common interests,” whereas Proposition 3
formalizes his statement that the larger a group is, “the less likely that it will act to
obtain even a minimal amount of such a good.” We complement these results by
characterizing the limit as group size goes to infinity (Proposition 4 in Section 3.4)
and by showing that for sufficiently large groups the expected number of participants
is increasing in group size if and only if the contribution cost is sufficiently low
(Proposition 5 in Section 3.5). We find the latter result interesting as it delineates the
circumstances under which larger groups not only have a lower success probability
but also incur higher expected aggregate costs than smaller groups.
The questions addressed in our Propositions 3 and 5 have been previously con-
sidered in Hindriks and Pancs (2002).4 In their Proposition 6 these authors claim
that “the effect of group size on the probability of provision is indeterminate.” In
contrast, our Proposition 3 shows that this effect can be determined and is negative
for the maximal equilibrium we consider. Hindriks and Pancs (2002, Proposition
7) also consider the case of large group sizes. While three out of the four claims in
that proposition are (as we prove) correct, their argument yielding these results is
not. The problem is that Hindriks and Pancs (2002) take for granted that the error
4The main focus of Hindriks and Pancs (2002) is on the effect of altruism on the equilibrium
provision of the public good. For the the teamwork dilemma (k > 1) we study here, the version of
altruism they consider does not affect the probability that the public good is provided and can
therefore be ignored (Hindriks and Pancs, 2002, Proposition 4).
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introduced by using the Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution can be
ignored when studying comparative statics for sufficiently large groups. Our result on
the expected number of contributors — which directly contradicts the corresponding
claim in Proposition 7 from Hindriks and Pancs (2002) — shows that this is not so.
As we have noted before, the games we consider differ from the volunteer’s
dilemma only in that we consider thresholds k > 1, whereas the volunteer’s dilemma
corresponds to k = 1. The kind of group size effects we study are much easier to
determine for the volunteer’s dilemma (see, for instance, the textbook treatment
in Dixit et al. 2004, p. 454–458) because its unique symmetric equilibrium is easy
to calculate explicitly. With the exception of Proposition 2 — in the volunteer’s
dilemma the payoff in the symmetric equilibrium is independent of group size — all
our propositions generalize corresponding results for the symmetric equilibrium of
the volunteer’s dilemma.
We discuss some other related literature that considers symmetric equilibria in
symmetric participation games to study group size effects in Section 4, where we
also note how our Propositions 1 – 3 can be extended to the second class of games
considered in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), namely participation games with refunds.
2. The threshold game
We consider the complete-information participation game from Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1984) with non-refundable contributions. For simplicity, we refer to this
as the threshold game. We first present the model and then collect some facts that
are relevant for the study of its symmetric equilibria. These facts are immediate
from the analysis in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), but for our subsequent analysis it
will be convenient to state them here.
2.1. Model
There is a group of n > 2 players. Players simultaneously decide whether or not
to participate in the provision of a public good by making a fixed contribution. If
k or more group members participate, the public good is provided. Otherwise, the
public good is not provided. Every player derives a benefit, which we normalize to
one, if the public good is provided and pays the participation cost c if participating.
Payoffs are the difference between the benefit obtained and the cost incurred. The
participation cost satisfies 0 < c < 1.
For k = 1 this game is the volunteer’s dilemma popularized by Diekmann (1985)
in which one contribution suffices to ensure the provision of the public good. As
the volunteer’s dilemma is well understood, we assume 1 < k < n throughout the
following.5
5In the case k = n, which corresponds to an assurance problem in the sense of Sen (1967), it is
5
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2.2. Symmetric strategy profiles and equilibria
As explained in the Introduction, we focus on the symmetric Nash equilibria of
the threshold game.6
We identify any symmetric strategy profile with the common participation proba-
bility p ∈ [0, 1] and let
pik,n(p) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k (1)
denote the probability that any player is pivotal for the provision of the public good
when such a strategy profile is played: as the participation of a player will make the
difference between provision and non-provision of the public good if and only if k− 1
out of the n− 1 other players participate, this probability is given by the binomial
expression on the right side of (1).
As we have assumed 1 < k < n, it is clear that p = 0 is a symmetric equilibrium
whereas p = 1 is not. Further, a symmetric strategy profile with 0 < p < 1 is a
symmetric equilibrium if and only if players are indifferent between participating
or not. This indifference condition requires the probability pik,n(p) that a player is
pivotal to be equal to the participation cost:
pik,n(p) = c. (2)
It is easily verified that the pivot probability pik,n(p) has the following unimodality
properties : (i) it is differentiable in p, (ii) it satisfies pik,n(0) = pik,n(1) = 0, and (iii) it
is strictly increasing on the interval [0, (k− 1)/(n− 1)] and strictly decreasing on the
interval [(k−1)/(n−1), 1] with non-zero derivative on the interiors of these intervals.7
In particular, (k− 1)/(n− 1) is the unique maximizer of the pivot probability pik,n(p)
in the interval [0, 1]. Hence,
c¯k,n = pik,n((k − 1)/(n− 1)) ∈ (0, 1) (3)
is the critical value of the participation cost such that for costs above this level the
pivotality condition (2) has no solution and, thus, no interior symmetric equilibrium
exists. If c = c¯k,n holds, then (k − 1)/(n − 1) is the unique solution to (2). If
an equilibrium for all group members to participate, thereby ensuring the provision of the public
good. We exclude this case as it adds nothing of interest to our analysis in Section 3 but would
require an additional case distinction.
6The game has a multitude of asymmetric Nash equilibria, including those in which the players
coordinate in such a way that k players contribute and the remaining n−k players do not contribute.
Further asymmetric equilibria are described in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984, Section 2).
7The first two of these properties are immediate from the definition of pik,n(p) in (2). The
remaining properties follow from observing that ln(pik,n(p)) = (k − 1) ln(p) + (n − k) ln(1 − p) +
ln(
(
n−1
k−1
)
) is strictly concave in p on (0, 1) and has its unique critical point at p = (k − 1)/(n− 1).
6
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Figure 1: Symmetric equilibria (circles) and the pivot probability (solid curve), here illustrated for
k = 2, n = 4, and c = 0.2. The pivot probability pik,c(p) is unimodal and has a unique maximum
at (k − 1)/(n− 1) with corresponding pivot probability c¯k,n ≈ 0.44. For c < c¯k,n there are three
symmetric equilibria with the maximal equilibrium (see Section 2.3), denoted by pk,c(n), satisfying
pk,c(n) > (k − 1)/(n− 1).
c < c¯k,n holds, the unimodality properties of pik,n(p) imply that (2) has one solution
to the left and one solution to the right of (k − 1)/(n− 1). This gives the following
characterization result for the number and location of symmetric strategy equilibria,
which specializes the characterization results in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984, Section
2) to the symmetric equilibria under consideration here. Figure 1 illustrates.
Lemma 1. For 1 < k < n the number and location of symmetric equilibria depends
on c as follows:
1. If c > c¯k,n, then p = 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
2. If c = c¯k,n, then there are two symmetric equilibria, namely p = 0 and p =
(k − 1)/(n− 1).
3. If c < c¯k,n, then there are three symmetric equilibria, namely p = 0, the unique
solution to (2) in the interval (0, (k − 1)/(n− 1)), and the unique solution to
(2) in the interval ((k − 1)/(n− 1), 1).
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We will refer to the symmetric equilibrium with p = 0 as the trivial equilibrium
and to symmetric equilibria with p > 0 as non-trivial equilibria. The following result
shows how the critical cost level c¯k,n from equation (3), which determines whether
non-trivial equilibria exist, depends on group size. The straightforward proof is in
Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2. For any k > 1, the sequence (c¯k,n)n>k is strictly decreasing with limit
c¯∗k = g(k − 1, k − 1) > 0, (4)
where
g(x, λ) =
λxe−λ
x!
, x = 0, 1, . . . , (5)
denotes the probability mass function of a Poisson distribution with parameter λ > 0.
To simplify the exposition, we exclude the uninteresting case in which the trivial
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for all group sizes and the non-generic case
in which there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium for some group size. That is,
throughout the following we impose
Assumption 1. For any k > 1, the cost parameter c satisfies
c ∈ Ck = {c ∈ (0, c¯k,k+1) : c 6= c¯k,n,∀n > k}. (6)
It is clear from Lemmas 1 and 2 that under Assumption 1 there exists n¯k,c ≥ k+1
such that two non-trivial equilibria exist if and only if n ≤ n¯k,c (where n¯k,c is infinite
if and only if c ≤ c¯∗k) and the trivial equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium
otherwise. We refer to n¯k,c as the critical group size.
Remark 1. Throughout our analysis we consider changes in group size for fixed
threshold k. A natural alternative, briefly considered in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984),
is to suppose that the threshold is proportional to group size. For this case Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984, p. 178) argue that “the only equilibria which are supported
by positive contribution costs for all n are the pure strategy equilibria”, that is, the
counterpart to our critical group size n¯k,c is always finite. More generally, Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) suggest (on the same page) that “mixed strategy equilibria
seem to ‘disappear’ in large populations.” In our model this is captured by the
observation (see Proposition 4) that the participation probability in the sequence of
maximal symmetric equilibria (and thus, a fortiori, for all sequences of symmetric
equilibria) converges to zero as group size diverges to infinity. As Proposition 4 also
shows, this does not imply that the equilibrium payoff and the success probability
converge to zero.
8
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2.3. Success probability, expected payoff, and the maximal equilibrium
Let
Πk,n(p) =
n∑
`=k
(
n
`
)
p`(1− p)n−` (7)
be the success probability, that is, the probability that the public good is provided in
the symmetric strategy profile p. If p is a symmetric equilibrium, then it is a best
response for any group member to choose not to participate, so that the expected
payoff of every group member satisfies
Πk,n(p)− p · c = Πk,n−1(p). (8)
As Πk,n−1(p) and Πk,n(p) are both strictly increasing in p (Lehmann and Romano,
2005, Chapter 3.4) it follows that among the symmetric equilibria for given parameter
values (k, c, n), the one with the highest participation probability p also induces the
highest equilibrium payoff and the highest success probability. We thus refer to this
equilibrium as the maximal equilibrium. We denote it by pk,c(n) and let
φk,c(n) =Πk,n(pk,c(n)), (9)
uk,c(n) =Πk,n−1(pk,c(n)) (10)
µk,c(n) =n · pk,c(n), (11)
denote the success probability, expected payoff, and expected number of contributors
at this maximal equilibrium.
By definition of the critical group size n¯k,c we have
n ≤ n¯k,c ⇒ pk,c(n) > 0, φk,c(n) > 0, uk,c(n) > 0, µk,c(n) > 0, (12)
n > n¯k,c ⇒ pk,c(n) = φk,c(n) = uk,c(n) = µk,c(n) = 0. (13)
Our interest in the following is to characterize, for given (k, c), the comparative
statics of pk,c(n), φk,c(n), and uk,c(n) over the range of group sizes in (12). For the
case n¯k,c =∞ we also investigate the limit as group size converges to infinity and
characterize the monotonicity properties of µk,c(n) for large groups.
3. Results
In Sections 3.1 – 3.3 we establish that over the relevant range of group sizes
the participation probability pk,c(n), the expected payoff uk,c(n), and the success
probability φk,c(n) are all strictly decreasing in group size n. Figure 2 illustrates
(for an example with finite n¯k,c). By far the deepest of these results is Proposition
2 in Section 3.2, which establishes the monotonicity of the expected payoff. The
result that the success probability φk,c(n) is strictly decreasing in n (Proposition
3 in Section 3.1) is obtained as an immediate consequence of Proposition 2 and
9
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Figure 2: Illustration of Propositions 1 – 3 for k = 6 and c = 0.2. The participation probability
pk,c(n), the equilibrium payoff uk,c(n), and the success probability φk,c(n) are all strictly positive
and strictly decreasing up to the critical group size n¯k,c = 22. For larger groups pk,c(n), uk,c(n),
and φk,c(n) are all zero.
the familiar observation, here restated as Proposition 1 in Section 3.1, that the
participation probability is strictly decreasing in n.
We record limit results for n → ∞ in Section 3.4, showing that the success
probabilities, expected payoffs and expected number of contributors induced by a
sequence of maximal equilibria converge to their counterparts in a game in which
group sizes is Poisson distributed as in Makris (2009). Finally, building on these
limit results, Section 3.5 identifies the precise conditions under which the expected
number of contributors is decreasing, resp. increasing in group size for sufficiently
large n.
3.1. The effect of group size on the participation probability
The maximal participation probability that can be sustained in a symmetric
equilibrium is strictly decreasing in group size for n ≤ n¯k,c (with (13) ensuring that
it drops to zero thereafter):
Proposition 1. Let n < n¯k,c. Then pk,c(n+ 1) < pk,c(n) holds.
10
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 1 for k = 3, n = 4, and c = 0.2. The pivot probability pik,n+1(p)
lies below pik,n(p) to the right of (k − 1)/n, implying that the maximal equilibria for consecutive
group sizes satisfy pk,c(n+ 1) < pk,c(n).
This result has been noted before by Offerman (1997, Theorem 2.3) and Hindriks
and Pancs (2002, Proposition 6(i)). We provide a proof in Appendix A.2 to make
the paper self-contained and to prepare the ground for the proof of Proposition
2. Figure 3 illustrates graphically how Proposition 1 results from the relationship
between the pivot probabilities pik,n(p) and pik,n+1(p). Before proceeding, we note
that, as suggested by Figure 3, Proposition 1 would also hold if we were to consider
the comparative statics of the smaller of the two non-trivial equilibria.8
3.2. The effect of group size on the equilibrium payoff
As we have noted in Section 2.3, in any symmetric equilibrium the payoff of every
group member is the same as if they were to choose non-participation while the other
8Indeed, as we have shown in previous work (viz., Pen˜a and No¨ldeke, 2018), for a large class
of symmetric participation games it is the case that all interior symmetric equilibria feature
participation probabilities that are strictly decreasing in group size.
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group members follow the equilibrium strategy. Hence, the payoff in the maximal
equilibrium is, as stated in equation (10), given by uk,c(n) = Πk,n−1(pk,c(n)). It is
then clear from Proposition 1 that there are two countervailing effects of an increase in
group size on uk,c(n): First, increasing group size for a given participation probability
p raises the probability that at least k of the n − 1 other group members provide
and therefore has a positive effect on the equilibrium payoff. Second, we know from
Proposition 1 that an increase in group size does not leave the participation probability
unchanged but decreases it. For given group size this causes the probability that at
least k of the other group members contribute to fall, and therefore has a negative
effect on the equilibrium payoff. The following result shows that the latter effect
dominates:
Proposition 2. Let n < n¯k,c. Then uk,c(n+ 1) < uk,c(n) holds.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix A.3. It proceeds in two steps. The
first step shows that the equality pik,n+1(pk,c(n+ 1)) = pik,n(pk,c(n)), which holds by
the pivotality condition (2), implies that for the maximal equilibrium the probability
that exactly k out of n− 1 group members participate is decreasing in group size,
that is,
pik+1,n+1(pk,c(n+ 1)) < pik+1,n(pk,c(n)). (14)
The second step infers from inequality (14) that the probability that at most k − 1
out of n−1 group members participate is strictly increasing in group size, so that the
complementary probability that at least k group members participate, Πk,n−1(pk,c(n)),
is strictly decreasing in group size. Both steps of the proof rely on a unimodality
property of the ratio of binomial probabilities with two different sample sizes from
Klenke and Mattner (2010).
It is essential for the result in Proposition 2 that we consider the maximal
equilibria for group sizes n and n+ 1. Indeed, arguments entirely analogous to the
ones proving Proposition 2 show that considering the smaller of the two solutions
to the pivotality condition for both group sizes reverses the inequality in (14) and
thereby also reverses the result: the payoff in these equilibria is strictly increasing in
group size.
3.3. The effect of group size on the success probability
Using (8) and (9), we can rewrite (10) as
φk,c(n) = uk,c(n) + pk,c(n) · c, (15)
thereby decomposing the effect of group size on the success probability induced by
the maximal equilibrium into two effects, namely the effect on the equilibrium payoff
and the effect on the participation probability. From Propositions 1 and 2 both of
these effects point in the same direction. Hence, the following proposition, is now
immediate:
12
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Proposition 3. Let n < n¯k,c. Then φk,c(n+ 1) < φk,c(n) holds.
The result in Proposition 3 is in sharp contrast to the corresponding claim in
Proposition 6 of Hindriks and Pancs (2002), who assert that “the effect of group
size on the probability of provision is indeterminate.” There are two sources for this
divergence in results. First, Hindriks and Pancs (2002) actually do not show that the
effect is indeterminate but simply observe that there are two countervailing effects of
an increase in group size on the success probability (probability of provision). In
contrast, our Proposition 3 establishes that for the maximal equilibrium the negative
effect of an increase in group size on the participation probability dominates the
positive effect of having more potential contributors. Second, we restrict attention
to maximal equilibria, whereas Hindriks and Pancs (2002) do not impose an explicit
equilibrium selection rule. This matters because, as we have noted in the last
paragraphs of Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the result from Proposition 1 is unchanged
but the result from Proposition 2 is reversed when considering the smaller of the
two non-trivial equilibria, so that the argument proving Proposition 3 is no longer
applicable. Indeed, as we have verified numerically, depending on parameter values
the success probability induced by the smaller of the two non-trivial equilibria can
either decrease or increase when group size is changed, so that for this equilibrium
the claim in Proposition 6 of Hindriks and Pancs (2002) is correct.
3.4. The Poisson limit
From the monotonicity results in Sections 3.1 – 3.3 the limits
p∗k,c = lim
n→∞
pk,c(n), φ
∗
k,c = lim
n→∞
φk,c(n), u
∗
k,c = lim
n→∞
uk,c(n)
are all well defined. As we will see below, the same is true for the limit of the
expected number of contributors,
µ∗k,c = lim
n→∞
µk,c(n).
In the following results, we consider the case in which the maximal equilibrium is
non-trivial for all group sizes, that is, we suppose c ≤ c¯∗k (see Lemma 2).9
Define
λk,c(n) = (n− 1) · pk,c(n) (16)
for all n > k. From the perspective of each player, λk,c(n) is the expected number
of other group members that will contribute in the maximal equilibrium pk,c(n).
Recall that we have used g(x, λ) to denote the probability mass function of a Poisson
distribution with expected value λ (see equation (5)). Appendix A.4 proves:
9Otherwise, the critical group size n¯k,c is finite and it is immediate from (13) that all of the
limits defined above are equal to zero.
13
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseis made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It. https://doi.org/10.1101/483149doi: bioRxiv preprint 
0 k − 1 µ∗k,c = λ∗k,c
expected number of (other) contributors
0
c
c¯∗ k
φ
∗ k,c
=
u
∗ k,c
1
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
g(k − 1, λ)
G(k, λ)
Figure 4: Illustration of Lemma 3 and Proposition 4 for k = 2 and c = 0.2. The limit of the
expected number of (other) contributors λ∗k,c = µ
∗
k,c is given by the larger of the two solutions to
the pivotality condition g(k−1, λ) = c. Both the equilibrium payoff u∗k,c and the success probability
φ∗k,c converge to the probability G(k, µ
∗
k,c) that there are at least k contributors given that the
number of contributors follows a Poisson distribution with expected value µ∗k,c.
Lemma 3. Let c ≤ c¯∗k. Then λ∗k,c = limn→∞ λk,c(n) is given by the unique solution
to the condition g(k − 1, λ) = c that satisfies λ ≥ k − 1.
The condition g(k − 1, λ) = c in the statement of Lemma 3 is the natural
counterpart to the pivotality condition (2) when the number of other contributors
follows a Poisson distribution with expected value λ. For c < c¯∗k, this condition has
two solutions. Lemma 3 indicates that the limit value λ∗k,c of the expected number of
other contributors is given by the larger of those two solutions. This is analogous to
Lemma 1 identifying non-trivial maximal equilibria as the larger of the two solutions
to the pivotality condition (2). This solution satisfies λ∗k,c ≥ k − 1 because (from
Lemma 1) the inequality λk,c(n) > k− 1 holds for all group sizes. Figure 4 illustrates
these considerations and the following Proposition 4.
From the convergence of λk,c(n) = (n − 1) · pk,c(n) to the finite limit λ∗k,c it is
immediate that p∗k,c = 0 holds. This in turn implies that the expected number of
contributors converges to the same limit as λk,c(n), that is, µ
∗
k,c = λ
∗
k,c holds. To
prove the following result it remains to establish that both the success probability
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and the equilibrium payoff converge to the probability that there are at least k
contributors given that the number of contributors follows a Poisson distribution
with expected value µ∗k,c. This probability is G(k, µ
∗
k,c), where
G(x, λ) =
∑
y≥x
g(y, λ), x = 0, 1, . . . . (17)
Proposition 4. Let c ≤ c¯∗k. Then,
p∗k,c = 0, µ
∗
k,c = λ
∗
k,c and φ
∗
k,c = u
∗
k,c = G(k, µ
∗
k,c) > 0. (18)
Proof. Using a generalization of the classical Poisson approximation (see, for in-
stance, Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 23.2) we have that (i) λk,c(n) → µ∗k,c implies
Πk,n−1(pk,c(n))→ G(k, µ∗k,c) and (ii) µk,c(n)→ µ∗k,c implies Πk,n(pk,c(n))→ G(k, µ∗k,c).
Using (7) and the second equality in (10), this proves the final two equalities in (18).
Further, as µ∗k,c > 0 is implied by the equality µ
∗
k,c = λ
∗
k,c and Lemma 3, we have
that, as asserted in (18), the inequality G(k, µ∗k,c) > 0 holds.
We note that the limit values for the expected number of contributors µ∗k,c and the
success probability φ∗k,c identified in Proposition 4 coincide with the values one would
obtain for the maximal equilibrium in a Poisson game (Myerson, 1998) in which
group size is commonly known to be a Poisson random variable with mean ν ≥ µ∗k,c,
but the actual realization of the group size is unknown to individuals. This holds
for any µ satisfying the above inequality, that is, in the Poisson game the expected
number of contributors and the success probability are independent of expected
group size as long as the expected group size is large enough. These observations
are in line with the convergence results from Makris (2009), who considers a model
for the provision of a binary public good in which, in contrast to the scenario we
consider, there is cost-sharing between participants and unused contributions are
returned.
It is of interest to ask under which circumstances the expected number of con-
tributors µk,c(n) exceeds the number of contributors k that are required for the
provision of the public good (Gradstein and Nitzan, 1990, Section 4). Lemma 3
and Proposition 4 provide an answer to this question for large group sizes. As the
probability mass function g(k, λ) of the Poisson distribution is decreasing in its
parameter λ for λ ≥ k (see the proof of Lemma 3) the following holds: for small cost
(0 < c < g(k − 1, k)) the expected number of contributors exceeds k for sufficiently
large groups, whereas for intermediate cost (g(k − 1, k) < c ≤ g(k − 1, k − 1)) the
reverse is true.
3.5. The effect of group size on the expected number of contributors in large groups
As we have discussed for the equilibrium payoff uk,c(n) (and is also the case for
the success probability φk,c(n)), an increase in group size has two countervailing
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effects on the expected number of contributors µk,c(n) = n · pk,c(n): on one hand,
for a given participation probability an increase in n causes the expected number of
contributors to increase; on the other hand, an increase in n causes pk,c(n) to fall
(Proposition 1). In light of Propositions 2 and 3 it is natural to conjecture that the
second of these effects dominates (i.e., that the expected number of contributors is
strictly decreasing in group size). However, the following proposition shows that
this is not necessarily the case. Specifically, Proposition 5 shows that for sufficiently
large groups the comparative statics of the expected number of contributors are
determined by how the participation cost c compares to a critical cost level, given by
g(k − 1, k +√k): for costs below this level the expected number of contributors is
strictly increasing in group size, whereas for costs above this level (but low enough for
non-trivial equilibria to exist for all group-sizes) the expected number of contributors
is strictly decreasing in group size.
Proposition 5. (i) Suppose c < g(k − 1, k +√k) or, equivalently, µ∗k,c > k +
√
k
holds. Then there exists N such that µk,c(n+ 1) > µk,c(n) holds for all n > N .
(ii) Suppose g(k− 1, k +√k) < c < g(k− 1, k− 1) or, equivalently, k− 1 < µ∗k,c <
k +
√
k holds. Then there exists N such that µk,c(n+ 1) < µk,c(n) holds for all
n > N .
The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix A.5. It uses Proposition 4 only to
ensure the equivalences noted in the statement of Proposition 5. In particular, the
proof does not use Proposition 4 to approximate the binomial probabilites appearing
in the pivotality condition (2) by their Poisson counterparts. Instead, our proof
relies on inequalities for the probability mass function of the binomial distribution
established in Anderson and Samuels (1967). This is essential, as the arguments
presented in the proof of Proposition 7(iii) in Hindriks and Pancs (2002) show that
using the standard Poisson approximation to the pivotality condition for finite n
leads to the mistaken conclusion that for sufficiently large n the expected number of
contributors is decreasing in group size irrespectively of the participation cost.
4. Discussion
We have studied the comparative statics of the maximal symmetric equilibrium in
the class of participation games without refunds introduced in Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1984). We have found that for all thresholds k > 1 the probability of participation,
the expected payoff, and the probability that the public good is provided in this
equilibrium are strictly decreasing in group size if the participation cost c is no larger
than the critical value c¯∗k identified in equation (4). Otherwise, these results hold for
all group sizes no larger than a critical group size n¯k with the participation probability,
the equilibrium payoff, and the probability that the public good is provided all being
zero for group sizes exceeding n¯k. In line with the suggestion from Palfrey and
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Rosenthal (1984, p. 178) that “mixed strategy equilibria ‘disappear’ as the number of
players grows large” we have found that the probability of participation converges to
zero as group size goes to infinity. However, for cost c ≤ c¯∗k this does not imply that
the equilibrium payoff and the probability of provision converge to zero. Rather, both
of these converge to the same strictly positive limit that has a simple characterization
in terms of the Poisson distribution. We have also signed the group size effect on the
expected number of contributors for large groups, showing, in particular, that this
effect is positive for sufficiently small cost. Overall, these results provide an almost
complete picture of the effects of group size on the maximal symmetric equilibria in
the class of games that we have studied.10
In their pioneering work, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) also consider a second
version of their participation game in which contributions are refunded when the
number of contributors fails to reach the necessary threshold. As shown in Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) this participation game with refunds has a unique non-trivial
symmetric equilibrium qk,c(n). For all c ∈ (0, 1) and n > k this equilibrium satisfies
0 < qk,c(n) < 1 and the indifference condition
pik,n(qk,c(n)) = c · Πk−1,n−1(qk,c(n)). (19)
Despite the significant structural difference between the participation games without
and with refunds, our arguments can be adapted to show that for c ≤ c¯∗k counterparts
to Propositions 1 – 3 hold for the participation game with refunds. We show this in
Appendix A.6.11
Makris (2009) considers symmetric equilibria in a variant of the participation
games with refunds in which excessive contributions are also refunded when the
threshold is passed: when there are ` > k participants the public good is provided,
but each participant only pays the cost ck/`. While his main focus is on games in
which there is both uncertainty about preferences and group size, he also briefly
considers (in his Section 3) the counterpart to the symmetric complete information
model that we have studied here and suggests in passing “that for sufficiently large
group-size the expected number of contributors and the probability of provision
10The one missing piece is a result characterizing the group size effect on the expected number of
contributors for all (rather than only for large) group sizes. We conjecture that there are only three
possibilities, namely that the expected number of contributors is (i) decreasing throughout, (ii)
increasing throughout, or (iii) unimodal. Proving this conjecture is a non-trivial task as it requires
to extend the analysis from Anderson and Samuels (1967) to obtain a complete characterization of
the comparative statics of the binomial probability mass function when the sample size and the
success probability are changed in such a way that the expected number of successes stays constant.
11The role of the condition c ≤ c¯∗k in this proof is to ensure that qk,c(n) exceeds the mode
(k − 1)/(n − 1) of the pivot probability pik,n(p) for all n. Whether counterparts to Propositions
2 and 3 also hold for the model with refunds when the participation cost exceeds c¯∗k is an open
question.
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decreases with group-size” (Makris, 2009, p. 296) in the unique non-trivial symmetric
equilibrium of such a model. In our view, it would be interesting to verify these
claims and check whether arguments similar to the ones we have given here can be
used to extend them to all group sizes.
Much of the recent literature on participation games has focused on the (more
realistic) case, first considered in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988), in which there is
incomplete information about costs and/or benefits. The comparative statics in
such models are quite different from the ones in the complete information model
that we have considered here. For instance, Johnson (2002) considers group-size
effects in a version of the volunteer’s dilemma featuring private information both
about idiosyncratic costs and benefits and finds that — contrary to what is true
in the volunteer’s dilemma with complete information and our model — the effect
of group size on the success probability is ambiguous whereas equilibrium payoffs
are strictly increasing in group size. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) characterize
(see their Table 2) the comparative statics of the participation probability with
respect to group size when agents have private information about their idiosyncratic
altruistic “warm glow” benefit from contributing to the public good, with Goeree
and Holt (2005, Proposition 4 and Footnote 20) then obtaining conditions under
which this characterisation implies that the participation probability first falls and
then rises with an increase in group size. In light of such results, there is little hope
of generalizing our arguments to participation games with incomplete information.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 2
Using the definition in (1), straightforward algebra shows that the equation
pik,n(p) = pik,n+1(p) has a unique solution in the interval (0, 1) given by pˆ = (k− 1)/n.
From the unimodality properties of the pivot probability pik,n(p) noted in Section
2.2, (k − 1)/(n − 1) is the unique maximizer of pik,n(p) over p ∈ (0, 1), so that
pik,n((k− 1)/(n− 1)) > pik,n((k− 1)/n) holds. Thus, we have pik,n((k− 1)/(n− 1)) >
pik,n+1((k − 1)/n). Recalling the definition of c¯k,n in (3) we thus have c¯k,n > c¯k,n+1.
From equations (1) and (3) we have, upon setting m = n− 1,
c¯∗k = lim
m→∞
(
m
k − 1
)(
k − 1
m
)k−1(
1− k − 1
m
)m−(k−1)
,
so that (4) follows from the classical Poisson approximation to the binomial distribu-
tion.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Let P := ((k− 1)/(n− 1), 1) and Q := [(k− 1)/n, 1). As pik,n((k− 1)/(n− 1)) >
pik,n+1((k− 1)/n) holds (Lemma 2), it follows from the unimodality properties of the
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pivot probabilities that for all q ∈ Q there exists a unique h(q) ∈ P such that
pik,n(h(q)) = pik,n+1(q)
holds. Further, the function h : Q→ P thus defined is continuous (in fact, differen-
tiable, as pik,n+1(q) is differentiable on Q and the inverse of the restriction of pik,n(p)
to the interval P is differentiable by the inverse function theorem). Observing that
h((k − 1)/n) > (k − 1)/(n− 1) > (k − 1)/n holds, where the first inequality is from
h((k − 1)/n) ∈ P , and that pik,n(p) and pik,n+1(p) have no intersection in the interval
P (see the proof of Lemma 2), we obtain h(q) > q for all q ∈ Q.
The condition n < n¯k,c in the statement of the proposition implies n+1 ≤ n¯k,c and
therefore that non-trivial equilibria exist for group sizes n and n+ 1. Thus, Lemma
1 yields pk,c(n) ∈ P , pk,c(n+ 1) ∈ Q, and pik,n(pk,c(n)) = pik,n+1(pk,c(n+ 1)) = c > 0,
so that pk,c(n) = h(pk,c(n + 1)) holds. Consequently, pk,c(n) > pk,c(n + 1) follows
from the inequality h(q) > q established in the preceding paragraph.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
As in the proof of Proposition 1, let P = ((k − 1)/(n− 1), 1), Q = [(k − 1)/n, 1),
and let h : Q→ P denote the continuous function satisfying
pik,n(h(q)) = pik,n+1(q) (20)
for all q ∈ Q. Following reasoning analogous to the one in the proof of Proposition 1
and using (10) to rewrite the equilibrium payoffs it suffices to show
Πk,n−1(h(q)) > Πk,n(q) ∀q ∈ Q. (21)
Towards this end, let us define
`(x, q) =
pix,n(h(q))
pix,n+1(q)
(22)
for q ∈ Q and x = 1, . . . , n. From (20) we have `(k, q) = 1 for all q ∈ Q. In the
following we first argue that this implies `(k + 1, q) > 1 and then, in a second
step, show that this inequality implies (21). The key observation underlying these
arguments is due to Klenke and Mattner (2010), who (in the proof of their Lemma
2.4) observe that, for x = 1, . . . , n− 1,
r(x, q) =
`(x+ 1, q)
`(x, q)
=
(
n− x
n+ 1− x
)(
h(q)
1− h(q)
)(
1− q
q
)
(23)
is decreasing in x. The second equality in (23) follows from (1) and (22).
Step 1: We show `(k+ 1, q) > 1 for all q ∈ Q. Because `(k, q) = 1, this is equivalent
to showing that r(k, q) > 1 holds for all q ∈ Q.
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It will be useful to begin by establishing the inequality r(k, q) > 1 for the lower
endpoint of the interval Q, that is, q = (k − 1)/n. Substituting this value for q into
equation (23) yields
r(k, (k − 1)/n) =
(
n− k
k − 1
)(
h((k − 1)/n)
1− h((k − 1)/n)
)
> 1,
where the inequality is implied by h((k−1)/n) > (k−1)/(n−1). Now suppose there
exists q ∈ ((k− 1)/n, 1) satisfying r(k, q) ≤ 1. Because h : Q→ P is continuous in q,
so is r(k, q). By the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions there then
exists qˆ ∈ Q satisfying r(k, qˆ) = 1. As r(x, qˆ) is decreasing in x, this implies r(x, qˆ) > 1
for all x satisfying 1 ≤ x < k. Consequently, `(1, qˆ) < `(2, qˆ) < . . . < `(k, qˆ) = 1
holds, where the equality is from (20) and (22). Similarly, we have r(x, qˆ) < 1 for all
x satisfying k < x ≤ n− 1, which implies `(n, qˆ) < `(n− 1, qˆ) < . . . < `(k+ 1, qˆ) = 1,
where the equality is from `(k, qˆ) = 1 and r(k, qˆ) = 1. Hence, we have `(x, qˆ) ≤ 1 for
x = 1, . . . , n with strict inequality for x 6∈ {k, k + 1}. Consequently, from (22) (and
the assumption k > 1) we have
n∑
x=1
pix,n(h(qˆ)) <
n∑
x=1
pix,n+1(qˆ). (24)
But this is impossible: from (1) the left side of (24) is one, whereas the right side is
smaller than one. Hence, no qˆ satisfying r(k, qˆ) = 1 exists and we have `(k+ 1, q) > 1
for all q ∈ Q.
Step 2: From `(k + 1, q) > 1 and `(k, q) = 1 we have r(k, q) > 1. As r(x, q) is
decreasing in x, this implies r(x, q) > 1 for all x satisfying 1 ≤ x ≤ k. Consequently,
`(1, q) < `(2, q) < . . . < `(k, q) = 1 holds. Because we have assumed k > 1 this
implies
k∑
x=1
pix,n(h(q)) <
k∑
x=1
pix,n+1(q).
From (1) and (7) this is equivalent to (21).
A.4. Proof of Lemma 3
Upon taking logarithms in (5) it is easily verified that g(k− 1, λ) is differentiable
and decreasing in λ on [k − 1,∞) with limλ→∞ g(k − 1, λ) = 0. Hence, as asserted
in the statement of the lemma, the condition g(k − 1, λ) = c has a unique solution
satisfying λ ≥ k−1 that we denote by λ∗k,c. It remains to show that λk,c(n) converges
to this value as n→∞.
As pk,c(n) satisfies the pivotality condition (2) for all n, we have
pik,n(λk,c(n)/(n− 1)) = c, ∀n > k.
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From Lemma 1 we also have the inequality λk,c(n) > k − 1 for all n > k.
Let  > 0 and λ = λ∗k,c + . Then g(k − 1, λ) < c holds and, by the Poisson
approximation to the binomial distribution, there existsN1 such that pik,n(λ/(n−1)) <
c holds for all n > N1. From the unimodality properties of the pivot probability
pik,n(p), we then have that λk,c(n) < λ holds for all n > N1. Let λ = λ
∗
k,c − .
If λ > k − 1 holds, then, using an analogous argument to the one we used when
considering λ, there exists N2 such that λk,c(n) > λ holds for all n > N2. If λ ≤ k−1
holds, then define N2 = k. We then again have that λk,c(n) > λ holds for all n > N2.
Letting N = max{N1, N2} we have established that for all  > 0 there exists N
such that for all n > N the inequalities λ∗k,c −  < λk,c(n) < λ∗k,c +  are satisfied.
Consequently, λk,c(n) converges to λ
∗
k,c.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (i) Suppose c < g(k− 1, k+√k) holds. From Proposition 4 and Lemma 3 we
have that µ∗k,c = limn→∞ n·pk,c(n) satisfies g(k−1, µ∗k,c) = c and µ∗k,c ≥ k−1. Because
g(k− 1, λ) is decreasing in λ for λ ≥ k− 1 (see the beginning of the proof of Lemma
3) this implies µ∗k,c > k +
√
k. An analogous argument shows that µ∗k,c > k +
√
k
implies c < g(k − 1, k +√k).
Suppose µ∗k,c > k+
√
k holds. As µk,c(n) = n · pk,c(n) converges to µ∗k,c there thus
exists N such that µk,c(n) > k +
√
k holds for all n > N . Consider any such n. The
first part of Theorem 3.1 in Anderson and Samuels (1967) then implies
pik+1,n+1(pk,c(n))
pik+1,n+2(pk,c(n) · n/(n+ 1)) < 1. (25)
Simple algebra shows
pik+1,n+1(p)
pik,n(p)
=
np
k
and
pik,n+1(q)
pik+1,n+2(q)
=
k
q(n+ 1)
.
Thus,
pik+1,n+1(pk,c(n))
pik+1,n+2(n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)) =
pik,n(pk,c(n))
pik,n+1(n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)) .
Hence, (25) implies
pik,n(pk,c(n)) < pik,n+1(n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)).
Because pik,n(pk,c(n)) = pik,n+1(pk,c(n+ 1)) = c holds (as both pk,c(n) and pk,c(n+ 1)
are non-trivial), we thus have
pik,n+1(pk,c(n+ 1)) < pik,n+1(n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)). (26)
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To establish the first part of the proposition, it remains to show that this inequality
implies
pk,c(n+ 1) > n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)⇔ µk,c(n+ 1) > µk,c(n). (27)
The pivot probability pik,n(p) is strictly decreasing in p in [(k − 1)/n, 1] and Lemma
1 implies that pk,c(n+ 1) ≥ (k − 1)/n holds. Thus, a violation of the first inequality
in (27) contradicts the inequality in (26), so that the desired conclusion follows.
(ii) The equivalence g(k− 1, k +√k) < c < g(k− 1, k− 1)⇔ k− 1 < µ∗k,c < k +
√
k
follows as the equivalence in part (i).
Suppose k − 1 < µ∗k,c < k +
√
k holds. Fix λ and λ such that
k − 1 < λ < µ∗k,c < λ < k +
√
k
holds. Because µk,c(n) = n · pk,c(n) converges to µ∗k,c there exists N1 > k +
√
k such
that λ < µk,c(n) < λ holds for all n > N1. Consider any such n. The function
R(λ, n) =
pik+1,n+1(λ/n)
pik+1,n+2(λ/(n+ 1))
is unimodal in λ in [k − 1, k +√k].12 Thus, the inequality
pik+1,n+1(pk,c(n))
pik+1,n+2(n · p(k,c(n)/(n+ 1)) ≥ min{R(λ, n), R(λ, n)}
holds. Observing that k − √k ≤ k − 1 holds, the second part of Theorem 3.1 in
Anderson and Samuels (1967) implies that there exists N2 ≥ N1 such that for all
n > N2 the inequality min{R(λ, n), R(λ, n)} > 1 is satisfied. Hence, for all n > N2
we have
pik+1,n+1(pk,c(n))
pik+1,n+2(n · pk,c(n)/(n+ 1)) > 1. (28)
Arguments analogous to the ones showing that (25) implies part (i) of the proposition
show that (28) implies pk,c(n + 1) < n · pk,c(n)/(n + 1), proving part (ii) of the
proposition.
12To verify this claim calculate
R(λ, n) =
(n+ 1− k)
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)n+1
nn
(n− λ)n−k
(n+ 1− λ)n+1−k
and observe that
∂ ln(R(λ, n))
∂λ
=
n+ 1− k
n+ 1− λ −
n− k
n− λ
is positive for λ ∈ [k − 1, k) and negative for λ ∈ (k, k +√k].
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A.6. Participation games with refunds
Suppose c ≤ c¯∗k, so that n¯k,c =∞ and Propositions 1 – 3 hold for all n > k > 1.
The following arguments show that corresponding results then hold for the unique
non-trivial symmetric equilibrium of the participation game with refunds.
We first show that the participation probability is strictly decreasing in group
size, that is, that qk,c(n + 1) < qk,c(n) holds for all n > k. From Proposition 6
in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) we have qk,c(n) > pk,c(n) for all n. Thus, using
the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1 for the sets P and Q, we have
qk,c(n) ∈ P and qk,c(n + 1) ∈ Q (because the equilibria pk,c(n) and pk,c(n + 1) are
both non-trivial by the assumption c ≤ c¯∗k). Now suppose that qk,c(n+ 1) ≥ qk,c(n)
holds. As pik,n+1(p) < pik,n(p) holds on P and pik,n+1(p) is strictly decreasing on this
domain, qk,c(n+ 1) ≥ qk,c(n) ∈ P implies pik,n+1(qk,c(n+ 1)) < pik,n(qk,c(n)). We also
have that qk,c(n+ 1) ≥ qk,c(n) > 0 implies Πk−1,n(qk,c(n+ 1)) > Πk−1,n−1(qk,c(n)) as
Πk−1,n−1(p) is increasing both in n and p. We thus obtain that the left side of (19)
strictly decreases when the group size is increased from n to n+ 1 whereas the right
side of (19) strictly increases, contradicting the hypothesis that qk,c(n + 1) is the
symmetric equilibrium for group size n+ 1. Hence, qk,c(n+ 1) < qk,c(n) must hold.
Second, we show that the equilibrium payoff is strictly decreasing in group size.
Denoting the equilibrium payoff in the participation game without refunds as a
function of group size by vk,c(n) we have (by the indifference condition) vk,c(n) =
Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)) for all n > k. Hence, our task is to show that Πk,n(qk,c(n + 1)) <
Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)) holds for all n > k. Towards this end, observe that (19) can be
rewritten as
(1− c)pik,n(qk,c(n)) = c · Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)). (29)
Now suppose that Πk,n(qk,c(n+ 1)) ≥ Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)) holds. From (29) we must then
have pik,n+1(qk,c(n + 1)) ≥ pik,n(qk,c(n). As pik,n+1(q) is continuous and decreasing
with limit pik,n+1(1) = 0 on Q, there then exists q˜ ≥ qk,c(n + 1) that satisfies
pik,n+1(q˜) = pik,n(qk,c(n). Because qk,c(n) ∈ P and q˜ ∈ Q hold, the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 2 implies Πk,n(q˜) < Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)). But as Πk,n(q) is
increasing in q, this contradicts the hypothesis Πk,n(qk,c(n + 1)) ≥ Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)).
Hence, Πk,n(qk,c(n+1)) < Πk,n−1(qk,c(n)) must hold, proving that vk,c(n+1) < vk,c(n)
holds.
Third, we conclude the argument by establishing that the success probability is
strictly decreasing in n, too.
As we are considering a non-trivial equilibrium with qk,c(n) > 0, choosing to
contribute with probability one is a best response if all other agents contribute with
probability qk,c(n). A player choosing this strategy obtains the public good and
pays the contribution cost if and only if at least k − 1 out of the other n− 1 group
members contribute. Hence, the equilibrium payoff satisfies
vk,c(n) = (1− c) · Πk−1,n−1(qk,c(n)). (30)
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The equilibrium payoff is also given by the probability that the public good is
provided if all n players contribute with probability qk,c(n) minus the expected
cost of contribution when following this strategy. As each player contributes with
probability qk,c(n) and in this case has to pay the cost c if and only if at least k − 1
of the remaining n − 1 players contribute, this means that the equilibrium payoff
can also be written as
vk,c(n) = Πk,n(qk,c(n))− qk,c(n) · Πk−1,n−1(qk,c(n)) · c. (31)
Substituting from (30) into (31) to eliminate Πk−1,n−1(qk,c(n)) from the latter equa-
tion, we obtain
Πk,n(qk,c(n)) =
[
1 +
qk,c(n) · c
1− c
]
vk,c(n).
Because both qk,c(n) and vk,c(n) are strictly decreasing in n, it follows that the
success probability Πk,n(qk,c(n)) is strictly decreasing in n.
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